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Motion Picture Censorship
and Constitutional Freedom
By P. D. McNANY, S.J.*
In January 1961 the Supreme Court decided its ninth case
dealing with the censorship of motion pictures.' For the first
time since 1915 the decision ran in favor of the censor.2 A ma-
jority of five justices held that states and local communities had
the power to require a license for showing a film within their
territory on the basis of a prior review and approval by a gov-
ernment official. A minority of four justices felt that such a sys-
tem of censorship was a violation of the first amendment priv-
ileges enjoyed by the motion pictures as a medium of expres-
sion. The question posed by these dissenting justices was the
crucial one of how the majority could reconcile the strictures that
censorship necessarily involve with the freedom guaranteed
by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Although the Bill of Rights mentions nothing specifically
about censorship, 3 there is strong historical evidence that prior
restraints on speech as epitomized in censorship by a government
official were prohibited by the enactment of the first amend-
ment.4 This evidence has been relied on by the Court in several
of its prior holdings,5 and there is no lack of dicta to the same
* Member of the Missouri Bar. A.B., Rockhurst College (1951); M.A., St.
Louis University (1958); L.L.B., Harvard (1960).1 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Holmby Prods. Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S.
870 (1955); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York 346 U.S. 587
(1954); Superior Films Inc. v. Department Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Gelling
v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 843 U.S. 495
(1952); Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).2 In Mutual Film, ibid. the Supreme Court upheld the censoring of motion
pictures by Ohio and Kansas.
3 The wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, seems to disallow
any sort of prior restraint. William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83,
173 A.2d 59 (1961).
4 Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648
(1955).
5 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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effect.6 Indeed, if one examines the almost necessary impact of
any form of censorship on freedom of expression,7 the conclusion
would seem to be that the first amendment forbids such a system
of control on the grounds of a practical infringement of protec-
ted liberty. Yet, despite these numerous arguments to the con-
trary, a majority of the Court insisted that censorship as regards
motion pictures does not violate their guaranteed status under
the first and fourteenth amendments.
By inquiring into the reasons behind this conclusion, it is
hoped that other problems raised in the general area of free
speech may also be clarified. For instance, the protection ex-
tended to various media of expression does not seem to be of
an equal quality.8 Further, the method of dealing with speech
by the Court in its balance-of-interests technique has been ques-
tioned as a derogation from the first amendment. And this ques-
tion itself raises the issue of whether the states are equally bound
with the federal government under the first amendment through
the fourteenth. Finally, the whole question of obscenity and its
relation to freedom of expression is critically involved in the
censoring of movies. It is not the purpose of this article to solve
all or any one of these complicated problems, but by investi-
gating the decisions of the Court on motion picture censorship,
it is hoped that some of these cognate areas of speech will be
illuminated.
I.
It is important in understanding the current interpretation
of the Court concerning motion pictures to return to the prec-
edents which govern it. Many writers consider that the Burstyn
decision'0 overruled entirely the earlier determination of Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n." But a careful reading of
Justice Clark's opinion reveals that the earlier precedent is over-
6 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 806 (1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939);
Lovell v. Griffin, 308 U.S. 444 451 (1938).
7 de Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A Study in Administrative Restraint, 20
Law & Contemp. Prob. 608 (1955); Emerson, supra note 4.
8 Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1-45;
Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, 119-20 (1962).
9 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259 (1961); Black, J. dissenting in
Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961).
-o Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
11236 U.S. 230 (1915).
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ruled only in so far as it fails to harmonize with the decision
in Burstyn.12 Therefore, it will be necessary to see what Mutual
Film said, what it meant in the circumstances of 1915 and what
it was used for in the intervening thirty-seven years. Further,
this understanding will go a long way in explaining why the
Court delayed correcting an opinion which gave aid and com-
fort to a system of censorship when it was busy eliminating far
less oppressive controls on expression in other areas. 3
A. In 1913 Ohio passed a motion picture censorship statute
which required that all films shown within the state be sub-
mitted for prior review and licensing before a board of censors. 4
The Mutual Film Corporation, a distributor, sought to enjoin
the enforcement of the statute on grounds that it (1) inter-
ferred with interstate commerce, (2) violated free speech under
the Ohio Constitution, '5 and, (3) constituted an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative powers. These arguments failed in the Ohio
courts and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Mc-
Kenna, for a unanimous court, likewise refused to overrule the
censor. The free speech issue was settled by excluding motion
pictures from the traditional protection given the press:
We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or
strained which extends the guarantees of free opinion and
speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised
on the billboards of our cities and towns . . . and which
seek to bring motion pictures and other spectacles into
practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty
of opinion.' 6
But the Court was careful to add the reason why control was
exercised. It was not merely because films were not protected
that the state could act. Rather the danger for evil which the
power of the screen exercised on the community gave the state
its ground for licensing.'7
12 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
13 For a review of the work of the court in the area of free speech up to
1941, see Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941).
14 103 Ohio Laws, 1913, act 322.
15 It should be noted that the speech issue touched only the Ohio con-
stitutional guarantees, but later cases applied to the federal constitution as well.
Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F.2d 715 (D. Conn. 1925).
'
6 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915).
17 Id. at 242, 244-45.
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The question whether the Court was correct in its judgement
that there was such a danger from movies can be raised, but in
the context of the time there was sufficient conviction about the
corrupting effect of cinema to prompt legislatures and munici-
palities to enact protective laws against it.'8 It was not for the
Court to deny the reasonableness of these fears when the state
came forward armed with the traditional argument for the pro-
tection of public morality.19 Even as late as our own day there
has been little scientific evidence either way on the so called
power of movies over audiences.2 ° The industry admitted at least
the possibility when it came to the phase of self-regulation in
the next decade. The grounds, then, on which the Mutual Film
case had been decided were not insubstantial. But later use
of the decision seemed to obliterate the fundamental point that
films were unprotected only in a narrow and technical sense.
Motion pictures were not only a medium of expression but
also a matter of property right. Indeed, the censor had been
first attacked on the basis of denying property without due process
of law.2' Thus there were two fights which deserved protection,
and in dealing with the films the courts may not have always
been aware of this essential duality.2 Mutual Film had denied
free speech protection to movies, but that did not mean that films
could be controlled unreasonably. Although not receiving the
full constitutional guarantees of the first amendment,23 motion
pictures were expression and merited that protection which cor-
responded to their value to society. This value was admitted by
the Court in its reckoning them as entertainment of a unique
kind.
Beyond this level lay the property fight to these communi-
cations which could also be invoked against arbitrary control
Is For a history of film censorship in the United States, see Inglis, Freedom
of the Movies, ch. 3 & 4 (1947).
19 Whelan, Censorship and the Constitutional Concept of Morality, 43 Geo.
L.J. 547 (1955), points out how the Court had established this principle in
other areas and then applied it to speech.20 Hovland, Experiments in Mass Communications (1949); Inglis, Freedom
of the Movies 21-22 (1947).
2Boc v. Chicago, 239 111. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909).
22 After Mutual Film the courts seem to ignore the property basis of the right
in particular. For arguments in favor of protection based on this right, see Note,
49 Yale L.J. 87 (1939). One of the few cases where a court alludes to this right
is Schuman v. Picket, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N.W. 152 (1936).
23 The Mutual Film decision had been extended to the federal constitution by
later cases, see supra note 15.
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which resulted in a destruction of their value. Later courts
seemed to have assumed that once motion pictures were de-
clared "unprotected," they were subject to the whim and fancy
of any local critic.24 But this was an abuse of Mutual Film,
though one, perhaps, that was invited by the very system of
control to which films were submitted.
The fact that the Court had approved a system of censor-
ship by its decision does not seem to have startled any members
of the Court itself into remonstrances. The reasons behind this
apparent disregard of a traditional American bias against cen-
sors were several. Foremost was the fact that the Court had not
yet applied the first amendment to state actions.25 This applica-
tion came only ten years later when the Court "assumed" that
the rights of free speech were guaranteed against the state as
well as against the federal govrment.26 But even after that, the
Court still had not developed its theory of free speech suffi-
ciently to include such peripheral areas as entertainment. An-
other reason for the long delay in revising its determination in
Mutual Film lay in the fact that the protection of movies had
not been denied entirely but merely brought into balance with
a real interest of the state to protect public morals.28 This bal-
ance was to be judged by the state itself in the first instance and
only where that judgment was clearly unreasonable would the
Court interfere.29  This deference to the state, to be sure, was
more restricted in matters of speech,3 but in this sensitive area
not all the strictures of the first amendment were applied to state
action.3 '
Thus it happened that the precedent in Mutual Film was to
have a long life during a time when other restrictions on speech
2 4 For a listing of some of the more extreme examples of judicial concessions
to the censor, see Kupferman & O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis
Blues, 86 Cornell L.Q. 278 (1951).25 As late as 1922 the Court had declared that the fourteenth amendment
does not guarantee freedom of speech against state action. Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).26 Gitlow v. New York, 286 U.S. 652 (1925).2 7 The Court first approached the subject when it passed on the mailing of
Esquire magazine. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
28 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29The problem of judicial review of a censor's determination is treated
infra pp. 454-55.30 Thornhill v. Alabama, 810 U.S. 88 (1940).
31 The problem of how the first amendment is applied to the states is
illustrated in Beauharnois v. Illinois, 348 U.S. 250 (1952). See Jackson, J.
dissenting, id. at 287.
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were quickly being dispatched.32  But apart from the strictly
constitutional grounds which seemed to support the decision,
there were other extraneous reasons which tended to prolong the
minority of motion pictures. Prominent among these would be
the state of the industry itself. By 1920 the movie people
realized that they had one successful method of warding off
official control, and that was through a system of "self-control."3
The developing techniques for keeping their own members in
line with public sentiment finalized in the Production Code Ad-
ministration [PCA],34 through which the motion pictures were to
win the respect of a large sector of the community. In the face of
this responsibility shown by the industry, the birth of new boards
of censors slowed considerably and finally stabilized at eight
states and up to ninety communities. 35 Thus the industry had
won the initial phase of its war and was satisfied to consolidate
its achievements.
Yet another aspect of the interim years between Mutual and
its retraction in 1952,36 was the developing of the medium of
motion pictures itself. By 1930 the use of sound had given the
movies an added reason for being included in the ordinary ac-
ceptation of speech under the first amendment. Further, the
growing awareness of the potentialities of film for more than
mere entertainment resulted in movies of a controversial type,
devoted to the exploration of social problems.ar Behind all of
this, however, lies the fact that Americans were coming to ac-
cept the screen for opinions on many things, perhaps a lamenta-
able situation, but one nonetheless true. This function as con-
veyor of public opinion was to be the source of freedom for
32 For a review of the work of the Court up to 1941, see Chafee, Free
Speech in the United States (1941).33 1nglis, The Freedom of the Movies, ch. 4 (1947).34 Shurlock, The Motion Picture Picture Production Code, 254 Annals 140
(1947).35 Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and Virginia. International Motion Picture Almanac 778 (1958). The number of
communities actually enforcing censorshi;), measures probably realized a high of
ninety prior to 1952. See, Velie, You Cant See That Movie: Censorship in Action,
Collier's, May 6, 1950, p. 11.36Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
37 In the area of race relations a series of movies ("Curley", "Pinkie", "Lost
Boundaries", and "Native Son") came out after 1945 which stirred up con-
troversy with the censors in segregated communities. See Kupferman & O'Brien,
supra note 24. "Native Son" was banned by the Ohio censor in Superior Films,
Inc. v. Department of Educ., 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953).
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motion pictures, yet the basis on which some sort of state sur-
veillance would also be placed.
B. After World War II the advent of foreign-made films
created a new situation for motion picture censorship. Until
now the industry had been solely located in Hollywood and con-
trolled by a few large corporations. Movies issuing from there
had been approved by the PCA officials and, although not always
fully approved by the local censors, had behind them a tradi-
tion of acceptability. The mores established by the PCA had
become a feature in American life and the activity of the censor
could be pretty well predicted.3 But when foreign films began
to be shown on American screens a new element was interjec-
ted into the relations of censor and cinema. That element was
the frank treatment of sex.39 Movies which created no problem
in countries where age-classification kept adult films for adults, 40
were cut or banned in America where audiences were unrestric-
ted.4' Indeed, the whole cultural difference between Europe and
America was often summarized in a single film.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson considered such a film. 42 Rossel-
lini's "The Miracle," a bold attempt to deal with the problem
38 The techniques employed by the PCA in approving films were based on a
close working relationship with the general practices of the film censors. For a
description of these techniques, see Inglis, op. cit. supra note 33, at 151.
39 Examples of this can be seen in the case of two foreign-made films
banned by local censors but upheld by the Court. In Commercial Pictures v.
Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954), the French film "La Ronde" was refused a
license for its treatment of sexual promiscuiV. On the same general grounds
another French product, "The Game of Love, was refused a license in Chicago.
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957). Another recent example of
resistance to the French style of sex in movies is the banning of "The Lovers."
Zenith Intl Films Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961). For
an examination of this decision, see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
40 For a comparative study of the various film censorship laws of France,
Germany and the United States, see Castberg, Freedom of Speech in the West
(1960).
41Age classification in the United States has suffered two set-backs.
Paramount Film Distribution Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.
Ill. 1959) and William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d
59 (1961). In this latter decision the age-classification section of the Pennsylvania
Motion Picture Control Act, while not directly ruled on, perished in the
invalidation of the law as a whole. But see the comments of the court, id. at
90, 173 A.2d at 66.
423413 U.S. 495 (1952). The film was the story of a young peasant girl
of less than normal intelligence who while intoxicated is raped by a stranger.
The child that she conceives she believes to he a miracle and that the stranger
was St. Joseph. Her illusion is held up to scorn by her fellow townsmen but
she bears it with constancy. In the end she bears her child with great joy
because it represents the object of her belief and love. The intended parallel
between the story and the biblical account of the conception and birth of Christ
is easily seen.
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of human love, was the cause of bitter protest among New York
audiences, especially Catholics, on grounds that it was sacri-
legious.43 The fact that it had been shown in Italy without
antagonizing the religious sensibilities of Italian Catholics pointed
to the complexity of the problem of trying to censor films on
religious grounds. The license originally issued was revoked
on judgment by the Regents of New York that the movie was
"sacrilegious."44 Appeal was taken to the New York courts where
the decision of the Regents was upheld. 5 In granting certiorari
the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to reconsider the long-
standing precedent of Mutual Film.
The issue of church-state, implicit in the case, 48 was by-
passed, the Court no doubt feeling that the speech issues pre-
sented sufficient complications. For a unanimous Court, Justice
Clark confirmed the contention of the plaintiff that motion pic-
tures were protected by the first and fourteenth amendments 7
Burstyn became a land-mark in the progress of the industry
toward full status as a medium of communication. But the Court
refused to go much further than a bare declaration of emancipa-
tion. How far this protection ran no one knew for sure. Two
things were clear, however. First, it was evident that the stand-
ard of "sacrilegious" was too vague to supply the protection newly
enunciated. Second, the real issue of whether any prior censor-
ship of movies was constitutional, was expressly reserved.48 This
surely indicated that the Court was not convinced that prior
restraint on films was altogether invalid. But from the opinion
itself one could not tell whether the negative pregnant could
thereby be safely followed, i.e., that some censorship would be
allowed.
At one point in the opinion this supposition seemed well
43 See concurrence of Frankfurter, J., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 843
U. S. 495, 507 (1952).
44 The film had been approved by the Motion Picture Division in November
1950. It had run for about eight weeks before it was recalled for review by the
Regents of the University of New York, the appeal board for the Motion Picture
Division. Their decision is final and the movie distributor is free to appeal to
the courts for review.
45 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740
(1951); aff d 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
46 See the brief amicus curiae of the American Jewish Congress arguing this
ground, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).47Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
48 id. at 505-06.
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founded for Justice Clark alluded to the matter of obscenity as
a possible ground on which the censor could be justified. As
yet, of course, the Court had not come to grips with the consti-
tutional problem of obscene expression, but certain dicta in past
cases indicated the direction in which they were tending.49
Constitutionally, the exception of obscenity still rested on the
basis established in Mutual Film, that is, that the state had a right
to protect public morality. And it remained the "capacity for
evil" that was the relevant factor in determining the scope of
control. Since obscenity was considered to be such a danger-
laden type of expression, it could be subject to proportionate
control. But the curious aspect of this suggestion in the context
of the case was the almost intrinsic vagueness that clung to the
term "obscenity." By comparison, the term "sacrilegious," con-
demned at length by Justice Frankfurter, 0 seemed far more
definite.
Perhaps the key to the future lay in the six line concur-
rence by Justice Reed where he pointed out the duty of the
Court in regard to the new freedom of the movies:
Assuming that a state may establish a system for the
licensing of motion pictures, an issue not foreclosed by
the Court's opinion, our duty requires us to examine the
facts of the refusal of a license in each case to determine
whether the principles of the First Amendment have been
honored. (Emphasis added.)51
This remark contained a prediction of how the Court was to
implement the franchise given to the movies. The case-by-case
technique which characterizes a fourteenth amendment due
process application by the Court was clearly suggested. It was
thus that the cinema was to receive its protection and the censor
brought under control of constitutional principles. It also would
provide an interim method of correcting errors before more gen-
eral principles could be formulated.
C. Where the Court in exercising its certiorari jurisdiction
makes use of per curiam reversals, its purposes have been in-
terpreted to mean that the decision below was clearly erron-
49nChaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568; 571 (1942); Near v.
Mipnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).0o Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 38 U.S. 495, 507 (1952).
51 Id. at 506-07.
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eous.52 If that may be accepted as a reasonable hypothesis in
most cases, its application to the film censorship decisions fol-
lowing Burstyn is unsatisfying. In each of the five cases handled
by per curiam reversal, the highest state or federal court had
upheld the censor almost without dissent. 53 It seems unreason-
able to say that all these judges were guilty of clear error. This
is especially true since the implications of Burstyn had not been
clearly spelled out, leaving to the lower courts a melange of new
and old by implying that Mutual Film was not entirely off the
books.
A more likely supposition than "clear error" for the use of
these per curiam reversals in the film cases was the essential lack
of agreement among the members of the Court.54 While all had
agreed that the motion pictures deserved protection, no one
agreed where the line should be drawn. In Burstyn the line
seemed to be no broader than the single term "sacrilegious," al-
though the principle of vagueness suggested that the method to
be followed was a due process one of weighing the conflicting in-
terests involved. That was opposed to the first amendment tech-
nique promoted by Justices Black and Douglas.55 They would
simply apply the strictures of the first amendment to all state
action. Unless there was an exception under a narrow applica-
tion of the clear and present danger test, no control on speech
was permitted. But such a suggestion went against the under-
lying reason for allowing state control in the first place. If the
states were to be equated with Congress as enunciated in the
first amendment and movies were protected speech, then reser-
vation of the question of prior censorship in Burstyn made no
sense. Justice Douglas implied this very thing when he read
Burstyn as saying that all censorship was outlawed.5" How he
managed to interpret Justice Clark's clear statement to the con-
trary is uncertain. But it was evident that he was taking a posi-
52 Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 155-56 (2d ed. 1954).
53 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957);
Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955); Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953);
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 159 Ohio St. 315 112 N.E.2d 311
(1953); Gelling v. Texas 157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1952).54
.Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 20-21 (1959).
55 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 588 (1954).56 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
[Vol. 50,
MOTION PicruRE CENSoRsHIP
tion on the undecided issue that was opposed to the case-by-
case method offered by Justice Reed.
The meaning that these five per curiam decisions have in the
light of later events is not of great importance. They contained
no explicit pronouncement of doctrine beyond a few short con-
currences. But they do represent a determination by the Court
to stand by its commitment to moving pictures. They also show
a progressive need to reach an agreement before the judicial
process cracked under the strain of silence.
Burstyn had condemned standards which were too indefinite
to provide a proper guide to censors. This same theme seems
traceable throughout the next five cases. In Gelling v. Texas57
the censor could ban any film which was "not in the best inter-
ests of the people of said city." A clearer invitation to arbitrate
the tastes of a community could hardly be devised. In Superior
Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ. 8 the standard, already once
approved for Ohio in Mutual Film, was also suspect of easy abuse.
It ordered the censor to issue a license to all films of a "moral,
educational or amusing and harmless character."59 Although
having greater exactitude than Texas required, Ohio's statute
seemed to leave ample room for arbitrary action. A New York
law, on the other hand, prohibited license to any film which was
"Immoral... or is of such a character that its exhibition would
tend to corrupt morals."0 This standard seemed much more nar-
rowly confined, but the Court reversed a decision under it in
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York.61 Doubt
begins to enter here as to the extent the Court was willing to
canr its stricture on vagueness when it had itself suggested ob-
scenity as a ground for a constitutional standard. Kansas, too,
found itself reversed in Holmby Prods. Inc. v. Vaughn6 2 where
its standard of "obscence, indecent and immoral, and such as
tend to debase or corrupt morals," was impugned. Finally, the
Court reversed a federal appellate court's holding that Chicago
57 Ibid.
58346 U.S. 587 (1954).
59 See, supra note- 16 and accompanying text. Thii law was declared
unconstitutional by the Ohio courts following the decision in the Superior Films
case. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 162 Ohio St. 263, 122
N.E.2d 769 (1954).00 N.Y. Edue. Law. §122 (a).
0i 346 U.S. 587 (1954). (companion case to Superior Films).
02350 U.S. 870 (1955).
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had correctly applied its standard of "obscene" to the movie
"Game of Love."63 Again it is difficult to tell whether vagueness
is a legitimate factor in a decision where obscenity is involved.
Perhaps the Court was suggesting that it had gone down to the
actual application of the standard rather than the standard itself
when it cited the Alberts case 64 in its last decision. Whatever was
implied in these silent reversals, the Court was definitely strain-
ing to formulate some sort of answer to the riddle of censorship
of protected free speech.
D. While motion pictures were winning free speech protec-
tion, another area of expression was being denied it. In 1957
the Court had squarely met the obscenity issue and determined
that this type of speech was not included in the guarantees of the
first and fourteenth amendments. 5 Like any Supreme Court
decision, Roth raised as many problems as it settled. While it was
clear that obscene speech was not protected, there were few
indications where the wall of protection ended, and how. Since it
was a matter of speech, the Court was careful to say that the
unprotected area was very narrow. But where the metes and
bounds were to be set up and by whom was left an open ques-
tion.6
All of this directly affected the movies. By now it had be-
come clear that obscenity was a cognate issue in almost every
case of film censorship. Until the matter of obscenity was itself
cleared up, the motion pictures would suffer accordingly. After
Roth there was a little more light to guide the confused state
legislatures, even if there were few interested in revamping film
censorship laws that had suffered silent defeats by the Supreme
Court.67
6 3 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 855 U.S. 85 (1957) (not to be
confused with case of same title decided by the Court in 1961, 365 U.S. 43).
6 4 Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In this case the Supreme
Court had formulated a narrow test for obscenity (see infra note 102 and accom-
panying text). But the test applied in Illinois at the time was at least as narrow.
See, American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 8 I1.2d 834, 347, 121
N.E.2d 585, 592 (1954).
65 Roth v. United States, 854 U.S. 476 (1957).
66 See, Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev.
1-45.
67 Besides Ohio, supra note 59, Pennsylvania had also invalidated their movie
censorship act. Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Carroll, 884 Pa. 848, 121 A.2d 584
(1956). But in 1959 it passed an entirely new act. Pa. Laws 1959, act 858.
For its recent invalidation, see infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York,68
the Court was faced with this "issue within an issue" by accept-
ing for review a film which New York had condemned as ob-
scene. The interesting aspect of the case was that the film was
based on D. H. Lawrence's novel "Lady Chatterley's Lover," a
piece of literature devoted to the advocacy of unconventional
ideas on sex in language and scenes even more unconventional.
Thus the whole complex nature of the obscene was before the
Court, i.e., an expression which contained elements of the seduc-
tive, the offensive and the ideological. 9 The question was
whether speech that dealt with sex on the level of ideas could
lose its status of protection if it chose a means of expression
that might offend some and corrupt othersJ 0
The film had lost a close fight in the New York courts.71 In
the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Conway made a classic state-
ment for the protection of public morality through censorship
of films. He had carried a bare majority, although the judges in
dissent were not in agreement .7  This pattern of confused dis-
agreement found its way into the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Stewart spoke for a unanimous court, but he represented,
in fact, only three justices. Two justices expressed no opinion. 3
The other four expressed different reasons for concurring in the
conclusion reached by the Court.
What New York had said in its newly clarified standard of
"immorality,"74 Justice Stewart believed, was nothing less than the
prohibition of ideas which go against accepted customs of sex
morality in that state. This meaning was drawn from the in-
terpretation made of the statute by the Court of Appeals. When
Chief Judge Conway spoke of immoral films he seemed to in-
68360 U.S. 684 (1959).
69 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 211 (1947).70 Prof. Kalven feels that offense to adult, voluntary audiences is never a
ground for control. Supra note 66, at 42.71 Xingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 348,
165 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1957); ret'd 4 N.Y.2d 849, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958).
72 judges Fuld, Dye and Van Voorhis dissented in seprate opinions.
73Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan expressed no opinion in the case.
74N.Y. Educ. Law §122(a) provides:
[T]he term 'immoral' and the phrase 'of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals' shall denote a motion picture film
or part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or
mornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or
ewedness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desireable,
acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.
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elude those which were immoral in theme only.75 Thus the ad-
vocacy of ideas was expressly threatened and the law was in-
valid under the first and fourteenth amendments. Whether the
New York court had really intended to say this is debatable, but
the distinction which Justice Stewart had drawn suggested the
difficulty of separating advocacy and portrayal of sexual immoral-
ity. Further it was an open invitation to Justice Harlan to elab-
orate on a theme which he had dealt with in Yates v. United
States.' That this justice did not take up the work on the nature
of advocacy he had begun earlier in the context of Communism
does not deny the relevancy of Justice Stewart's challenge.
What Justice Harlan did say,77 joined by Justices Frankfurter
and Whitaker, was that New York's law did not forbid ideas.
The purpose of the law was to eliminate incendiary films from
the New York theatres. Thus portrayal and not advocacy was
forbidden. This was directed at Justice Stewart. Against the
position of Justices Black and Douglas that the first amendment
outlawed all censorship,7 Harlan proposed that a due process
technique was in order. It was on a case-by-case examination
of the application of standards to specific films that the Court
would spell out the protection afforded the movies by Burstyn,
not by a whole-sale foreclosure of the issue. Behind such an
approach lay the feeling that methods of dealing with the problem
of obscenity were not to be struck from the states' hand on mere
conviction that such methods were unwise.
In answer to such a proposition of procedure, Justice Black
made a perceptive objection.79 As far as he could see the tech-
nique suggested by Justice Harlan and company had the effect
of turning the Court into a Supreme Board of Censors. If each
application of standards of obscenity to the film in question was
to be examined, then the determination of that issue ultimately
lay with the Court and not with the local community where-
if anywhere at all-it belonged.
75 "It embraces not only films which are visually suggestive and obscene,
nor only those which are sexually suggestive and immoral in theme, but those
which combine the two." (Emphasis added.) Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 351-52, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1958).
76354 U.S. 293 (1957).
77 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 702
(1959).
78 Id. at 690, 697.
79 Id. at 690.
[Vol. 50,
MOioN PicruRE CENsoiSmp
However the Justices would be finally reconciled, the real
issue at the heart of the case was again by-passed. Whether the
prior licensing of films was in itself unconstitutional was the
question which all the motion picture litigants had asked the
Court. For seven times, now, the answer had been quietly
shelved. There were always other grounds to give the movie
people the victory but not the war. They felt that the coup de
grace could only be administered if that issue alone were before
the Court. This became the main task of the lawyers who were
directing the fortunes of the motion picture interests.
E. The distinction between restraint on speech that is prior
to publication and that which follows publication has a long his-
tory in American law. 0 The Court had spoken of the distinction
in the Near opinion, written by Chief Justice Hughes,81 giving it
an established place among principles of constitutional interpre-
tation. But question had been made of the usefulness of such a
distinction if the analysis of the factual situation stopped at the
level of mere identification of a restraint as prior.82 A more
realistic approach had been adopted by the Court in a later
opinion83 where the majority had said that the test was the prag-
matic assessment of the actual restraining effects on speech ex-
ercised by the control in question, not the mere fact that it was
either prior or subsequent.8 4
With this recent decision in mind, plus a clear indication by
the Court of its reluctance to deal with the issue of prior re-
straint on films, the lawyers for the motion picture litigants should
have been reasonably warned that the decision might go against
their clients. But they continued to believe that popular opinion
against censors would ultimately be determinative of the con-
stitutional issue. Still one wonders why the Court granted certi-
orari in a case where the issue of prior restraint had been achieved
at the sacrifice of a concrete case. In consenting to review Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago5 the Court was apparently vio-
lating its freedom to choose among issues.88
80 See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob.
648 (1955).8 1 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
82 See, Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533
83 Kingsley Books v. Brown, 854 U.S. 436 (1957).
84 Id. at 441.
853 65 U.S. 43 (1961).
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The facts of the case were as follows. The plaintiff distributor
had sought a license from the Chicago censors, tendering the fee
but refusing to submit the movie for review. His grounds were
that such a prior review was an unconstitutional restraint on
speech protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. The
lower federal courts were unimpressed by this argument and
could discover no justiciable issue but only an "abstract ques-
tion of law."T Since the film was before the courts in name only
(provocatively entitled "Don Juan"), the ordinance in question
had not been applied and could not be challenged. Until a license
had been denied on the basis of the law in question, the case re-
mained entirely theoretical.
But the Supreme Court discovered the controversy in the
very right of the city to condition the issue of a required license
on the basis of submission of a film for review by the censors.18
Or as Justice Clark framed it: "Whether the ambit of constitu-
tional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to ex-
hibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." 9
Put in those terms, (ones used by counsel for the plaintiff), the
decision of the issue was less difficult than it might have been
since the theoretical nature of the case allowed the Court to
hypothesize the vilest sort of film which would in turn justify
prior censorship. The abstract attack on the Chicago ordinance
left that statute unconsidered in the case since the injury was
done by the implimentation of the very purpose of the law, not
by the application of standards set out in its sections.
A majority of five justices held that the issue as it was framed
by Justice Clark had to be answered in the negative. Did that
mean that the Constitution approved of censorship? Only in the
limited and negative sense that not all prior control on motion
pictures was denied the state.
Justice Clark began by reiterating that the freedom of speech
is no absolute right. Further, even as to the use of prior re-
straints there were exceptional cases, of which obscenity was
one, where this form of control was allowable. The determin-
86 See, Bickel, The Passive Virtues: Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1960
Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 57-58 (1961).8 7 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959).88 Cf. Staub v. City of Barey, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).8 9 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46 (1961).
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ation of the issue of prior restraint was a matter of pragmatic
assessment. To affirm the plaintiff's case would be to say that the
Constitution limits the state to one method of control on all
speech, even that unprotected by the Constitution itself. This is
not to assert that censorship may be unlimited, but only that
in the case of motion pictures and under the attack made here
against prior licensing, censorship is not invalid.
The opinion left many questions unanswered, but it was clear
that the Court was going to continue to pursue it's case-by-case
method of review of film censorship litigation. It refused to settle
the issue by ruling out all prior control. Had the majority gone
the other way, they would have read out of the Constitution all
possible use of prior control in any form, a reading that would
seem to contradict the exceptions in Near 0
Chief Justice Warren dissented in a long opinion91 which
summarized much of the free speech litigation over the past
thirty years since the Near decision, 2 in which prior restraint was
first clearly impugned as an invalid means of control. The force
of his argument was simply that prior licensing of motion pic-
tures was censorship and this form of control had always been
condemned by the Court. He went on to show the dangers in-
volved in establishing a censor in power and pointed out how
the Chicago ordinance worked grave hardships on the free ex-
pression of ideas through films. It was here that he seemed to
reframe the issue in the case. For him it was not a question of
whether the Constitution allowed one free showing to every
film, but whether the Constitution allowed censorship. 93 The
majority had decided that it did and, in giving no principle on
which to distinguish the various media, had made its answer
into a general approbation of prior control of all speech.
The grounds for disagreement on the issue of the case derived
from its hypothetical character. The plaintiff was challenging
all systems of prior licensing for films and in so doing had to
sacrifice a particularized attack on the Chicago statute. The
issue thus presented had an advisory flavor. It spoke in terms
of "all cases" and allowed for no limited interpretation of the
90 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931).91 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961).
92 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931).93 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 55 (1961).
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Constitution. When the majority attempted to so limit its answer
to some sort of obscenity exception the dissent challenged its
right to do so. Indeed, such a limitation would be impossible if
the question had only a "yes" or "no" answer. That the Court
refused to give such an answer even the motion picture people
were later willing to concede.94 But some sort of answer had
to be given and the principle that grounded the affirmation of
prior licensing was not entirely clear.
Justice Clark clearly saw the force of the criticism which
the Chief Justice leveled against the majority opinion, that it
contained an implicit condonation of the principle of censorship
as constitutionally permissible. Some principle for justifying prior
restraint for motion pictures alone, and even there in a limited
area, was necessary. Returning to his earlier opinion in Burstyn
he said:95
We recognized in Burstyn that 'capacity for evil ...
may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of
community control,' and that motion pictures were not
'necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any
other particular method of expression. Each method, 'we
said,' tends to present its own peculiar problems.
As a constitutional principle this seems to be no more than an
assertion that the Court will pursue a due process technique of
balancing the interests of freedom and public morality where films
are involved.96 Because of the particular features of each medium
of communication and the specific problems that each creates,
the Court will withhold judgment on each one until they come
individually before the Court. Unfortunately the Court did not
elaborate the principle announced and left for a later day a
fuller articulation of the dimensions which it contained.
Thus the status of motion pictures after ten years of litiga-
tion was anomalous. Films had been recognized as a medium
for the expression of ideas and included within the protection of
the first and fourteenth amendments. But this freedom did not
rule out the use of prior censorship to control expressions found
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1961, p. 20, col. 6.95 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1960).96 Th"peculiar problems" concept can be traced back to the concurring
opinion of Jackson, J., in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949). For a critique
of the use of this method, see Kauper, The Constitution and Civil Liberties 85-86,
111-26 (1962).
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to be dangerous to the community. How wide the scope of such
control was the Court had not definitely said, but it had nar-
rowed it effectively through a series of decisions which pointed
to obscenity as the only permissible grounds for review. Further,
in withholding a final elimination of the censor, the Court prom-
ised to continue its case-by-case review of the application of this
narrow standard.
II.
In gradually articulating the general norms laid down in the
Times Film decision, the Court must surely face the issue of ob-
scenity. In each of their opinions on film censorship, obscenity
has been mentioned as one possible ground on which prior licens-
ing might be valid. 7 Therefore it will be helpful to examine the
nature of this type of expression, its peculiar aspects when used
in movies, and the control of it by prior censorship.
A. In Roth v. United States98 the Court held that obscene
speech was not protected under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.99 But this decision did not end the problem of the Court
for it left open questions as to the determination of the issue in
each case, the procedural safeguards required and the type of
review which will be made.100 What Justice Brennan had said in
his majority opinion in Roth was that obscene speech has been
traditionally regarded as socially worthless and not protected by
free speech guarantees. 1 He went on to define the test for
obscenity as: "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 0 2 But
even after he had gone this far, there still remained the problem
as to the application of this test to the expression in question.
Since the key word of "obscenity" had been merely replaced by
9 7 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961); Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 843 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
98 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
99 The Roth case dealt with a federal mailing statute and thus directly
involved the first amendment. The companion case, Alberts v. California, was a
state obscenity action and was contested on grounds of violation of the fourteenth
amendment.100 Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).101 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). For a commentary
on the doctrine of "social utility" as applied to speech, see Kalven, supra note 66.
102 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
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another key word, "prurient," the core meaning of the term may
still leave room for a variety of interpretations. 10 3 It was this
element of uncertainty in matters of speech which seemed in-
tolerable to Justices Black and Douglas."0 4
While the majority emphasized the worthlessness of ob-
scene speech, Justice Harlan'0 5 chose a somewhat different ground
for allowing it to be controlled. Since states are interested in
fostering proper attitudes toward sex in relation to marriage, the
evil inherent in obscene communications provides a legitimate
basis for its control. Thus the non-protection is more a matter of
averting an evil than in judging the value of speech.10 6 It is true
that many have disputed the nature of the evil involved in ob-
scenity10 7 and whether it provided a valid occasion for state
action, but until there was evidence against the traditional argu-
ment from common sense that obscenity was corruptive of morals,
legislatures could continue to act. 08 Perhaps Justice Brennan had
simply tried to by-pass the dispute over the nature of the evil in-
volved when he suggested that obscenity was worthless and
therefore could be controlled.
Because of the highly complex nature of the obscene,10 9 there
is need that the determination in each specific case be closely
scrutinized. This scrutiny, suggested Justice Harlan, 11° is a mat-
ter of a delicate constitutional judgment. The issue in each case
is not "What is obscenity?," but rather "Is this item obscene?"
This is not only a factual determination but a matter of con-
stitutional interpretation."' It will be necessary for the Supreme
Court to continue vigilance in these cases since the local de-
termination of the issue may be in excess of the narrow limits
set down.
103 Kalven, supra note 66, at 15.
104 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957).
105 Id. at 496.
90 6 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Winter v. New York, 833 U.S. 507, 520
(1948).
107 Compare Frank, J., concurring, United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801
(2d Cir. 1956) with Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography
from the Mail, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 70 (1957).108 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501-02 (1957).
109 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 69.
110 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957).
"' Id. at 497. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1, calls the issue of obscenity a constitutional fact which the court is free
to review de novo, at 20-21.
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This raises a problem which is inherent in the very nature of
obscenity. By definition the Court has indicated that the ques-
tion of obscenity is local by allowing it to be settled according
to "community standards." 2 This means that the judgment of
the community as to what its standards are is a controlling factor
in saying what is obscene. But if this is to be subject to a de novo
type of review by the higher courts, then the final determination
rests with these courts and not with the local community. If,
as Justice Black charges," 3 the whole business of obscenity is
a matter of subjective prejudice anyway, then it will be the
prepossessions of the Supreme Court which will be final arbiter
of the control allowable to the state.
But the Court has not insisted on a review of the local judg-
ment on the basis of a de novo determination of the issue. Rather
the review has looked to the procedural guarantees that the de-
termination was really a matter of local standards.".4 There was
a series of cases, however, which the Court reversed per curiam." 5
but two of these involved federal mailing statutes and thus did
not depend on a determination of a local community." 6 The
third, the Times Film case of 1958, did seem to be an arbitrary
reversal of an opinion supposedly based on community stand-
ards. However, the Court was dealing here with a case of
censorship and may have felt that the issue had not been fairly
determined." 7
B. The peculiar nature of the medium involved gives ob-
scenity a variety of aspects. Thus mail-order obscenity tends to
be of a particularly scabrous type, reaching many young people
112 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The court has
indicated that it will demand some proof that community standards have been
met. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). See also, Zenith Int'l Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961); Portland v. Welch, 364 P.2d
1009 (Ore. 1961).
"13 See Justice Black concurring in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155(1959).
"14 Supra note 112.
"15 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v.
Olsen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35(1958).116 Thurman Arnold has suggested that the use of per curiam reversals of
obscenity cases is entirely legitimate because the court decides on the basis of a
non-reasoned judgment that does not admit of elaboration. See, Kalven, supra
note 111, at 42-44.
117 The Pennsylvania film censorship law was successfully attacked for lack
of a jury determination of the issue of obscenity. See infra notes 167-75 and
accompanying text.
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directly.'" The problem of book-store sales of obscene works
has a different shading than the same problem when it arises in
the context of the motion pictures. Even here, there is a variety
of types that go from the pornographic stag reels to the artful
foreign film. If the Court is to adhere to its announced principle
of "pragmatic assessment" of the factual implications of each
case, all these particular shadings must be part of the ultimate
determination. That is why the unarticulated major premise
of the Times Film decision that every medium of expression has
its own peculiar problems has to be filled out with a brief ex-
amination of some of the peculiarities of moving picture ob-
scenity.
Since the Mutual Film opinion of Justice McKenna, there
have been admissions by the Court that films create problems
of their own." 9 These have tended to be summed up in the term
"impact" of motion pictures. Although the Court itself has not
dilated on this problem, briefs for various appellees have brought
out a number of facets. 20 The opinions of other courts have also
explicated the dangers involved in film portrayal of sexual
themes. 21 It must be admitted, however, that there is much
more assertion than evidence about the dangers of films, as the
industry has pointed out. 22 But a brief summary of several of the
more evident facts about motion pictures will serve to point up
the differences in this type of obscene communication.
The primary characteristic of moving pictures is there use
of simultaneous audio-visual images. This gives the experience
which they convey an immediacy which other media lack. Thus
the film does not depend on the active participation of its audi-
ence nor require of it the necessary preparation of literacy for
its fundamental reception. This combination of passivity and
low intellectual requirements has proven a successful formula
118 Kilpatrick, The Smut Peddlers (1960).
119 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 691(1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1951); Mutual Film Corp v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1915).
120 Brief for Respondent, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, id.; Brief for
Respondent, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, id.
121 Regents of New York v. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 175
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958); Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 3 N.Y.2d
237, 248, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42, 51 (1957).
122 See, Brief of Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae, pp.
18-22; Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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for any medium of mass entertainment. The various technical
advances since the inception of the film industry have only gone
to underline the original quality of immediacy. Thus the use of
sound and color have helped bring the cinema into closer verisi-
militude with life itself, even in some cases passing beyond the
limitations of ordinary perception and reproducing a world of
startling effects.123
Thus to pose the problem of obscenity in this context is to
raise a unique question as to the power of artistic re-creation of
human experience. The question of equality among the media
of expression as far as constitutional protection goes is cast in a
different light by a consideration of the vast differences that
separate the media and their communication. This feeling is
shared by the film industry itself and expressed in the need it
experienced to establish some intra-industry regulation. The
influence that motion pictures have, beyond the mere physical
impact described above, derives from other social factors which
make films a uniquely American institution.124
There are at least two problems which the law faces in deal-
ing with film obscenity. The first is the meaning of advocacy of
ideas in the context of motion pictures. The second is the fact that
young people constitute a major part of the screen audience.
The operative distinction in the Kingsley Pictures case, 25 was
that made between the portrayal and the advocacy of sexually
immoral acts. 26 Justice Stewart felt that New York had forbidden
movies to advocate unconventional ideas about sexual morality
when it refused to issue a license to a film which proposed adult-
ery as a proper pattern of behavior. 2 7 Justice Harlan interpreted
the Court of Appeals as saying that it simply outlawed the por-
trayal of such acts.128 There seems to be ground for both sides
123 See, Kracauer, Theory of Film 164 (1960). Perhaps the difculty the
Court has experienced in dealing with films is the fact that they are as yet very
little understood. The complexity that comes out of a book like Kracauer's is in
strange contrast to the simplistic description found in briefs for both sides of any
film censorship case. The decision of Times Film seems to be no more than a
reflection by the Court of this feeling of frustration in dealing with an unknown.
124 For an analysis of some of the reasons why people attend films, see David
& Evelyn Reisman, Movies and Audiences, 4 Am. Q. 195-202 (1952).
12 5 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
126 Id. at 688-89.
12 7 For the wording of the New York statute, see supra note 74.
128 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684,
705-06 (1959).
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in the wording of the opinion by Chief Judge Conway.129 But the
question is whether the advocacy of ideas about sex takes on a
different complexion when the advocacy is done with images.
The prohibition against obscenity was strictly limited by the
Roth opinion to make room for a legitimate discussion of sex.130
This discussion will include treatment of sex in the novel and
the other art forms. But as one moves away from the discussion
of sex to the portrayal of sex by the artist, different problems
are raised. While a lecturer depends on the rational content of
his subject as he talks on the nature of sex, no such supposition
is made by the artist. For him the purpose is to use the emotions
to carry an experience. Thus the treatments of sex by the two
persons, although broadly within the same category of expres-
sion of ideas, are widely different. When one adds to this dif-
ference the dimensions of portrayal that constitute a film version
of a novel treating of sex, the problem undergoes yet a more
drastic change. Consider the result if a motion picture were to
be entirely faithful in reproducing a novel. "Lady Chatterley's
Lover" taken from between hard covers and put in detail upon the
screen would have been in flagrant violation of permissible frank-
ness.
Yet the problem remains. Can movies advocate ideas in the
area of sex or not? The answer must be yes. But the difference
between a legitimate advocacy and a lurid portrayal may not
always be an easy decision to make.
A further complicating factor in determining the exact nature
of motion picture advocacy of ideas dealing with sex is the nature
of the audiences involved. Chief Justice Warren has suggested
that the audience to which obscenity is directed plays an im-
portant part in determining whether items are in fact obscene.'3 '
This becomes clearer when placed in the context of advocacy
where incitement may be determined on the basis of the effect
on the audience. 32 The fact that movies play to large teenage
audiences may have been behind an unwillingness on the part
129 Regents of New York v. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 175
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958). Justice Clark sided with Justice Stewart. Kingsley Intl
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 699 (1959).
130 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
'31 Ibid; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 854 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).
132 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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of the Court to immediately eliminate prior censorship once mo-
tion pictures were raised to first amendment status. Although
it would seem to be unconstitutional to impose a juvenile stand-
ard of obscenity on the community as a whole,13 3 still the wide
appeal of cinema to young people makes the use of age classi-
fication, at least, a legitimate alternative to full censorship. 3' But
whether it is valid to consider the impact of the advocacy of ideas
on sex by movies when the audience contains a majority of minors
remains an unanswered question.
C. The personal sins of the censor are too well known to
bear repeating here. Everyone knows the long list of victims
that have been the legacy of such a system of control.'3" That
motion picture licensing as it is practiced in the United States
constitutes such a system of control is beyond doubt.' 36 But
analysis can not end there. It must, in the words of the Court,
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go on to a "pragmatic assessment" of the factual derogation of
freedom. In sustaining film censorship legislation the Court in-
dicated that there are differences which distinguish prior re-
straint in this form from its application in other areas.
The states and communities which have adopted film licens-
ing techniques have pleaded necessity as a justification for de-
parture from the traditional use of subsequent punishment as
a means of control.' 38  Their argument is that films present a
unique problem in matters of obscenity. If they are not reviewed
before showing, the remedy of prosecution under criminal statutes
comes too late to avert the evil. With the modem theatres hold-
ing mass audiences and the program of multiple distribution
within the state, piecemeal prosecution is simply impractical.
Furthermore, the punishment falls upon the wrong person. The
exhibitor is not always able to choose the type of films he shows. 39
Thus the real culprits, the producers and distributors, lose only a
133 Butler v. Michigan, 852 U.S. 880 (1957).
'34 See, Note 69 Yale L.J. 141 (1959). But see, supra note 41.
135 Levy, Legacy of Suppression (1960).
136 See, Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob.
648, 667 (1955).
'37 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
138 See, Brief for the Respondent, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
139 He is in an analogous situation to the magazine seller who is forced to
take magazines he doesnt want in order to get the ones he does. It is questionable
whether the film exhibitor could set up the defense of lack of scienter used
successfully in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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certain box-office take and nothing more. The solution lies, then,
in a system of prior review and licensing of films which protects
the community and exhibitors at the same time.
Prominent among other reasons for justifying prior control
of films ranks the fact that movies are considered an entertain-
ment medium. 4 ° Since the theory of constitutional liberty had
been traditionally associated with the political process,' 4' for a
long time entertainment was regarded as unprotected. But by
1942 protection began to be extended.'4 Even here it was not
clear whether the protection was given on the basis of the Con-
stitution or from an inability to distinguish entertainment from
the expression of ideas. 43 But it was clear from what happened
in the area of motion pictures that the protection was not of the
same quality as that afforded other media of the press.144 Hence
the proposition about freedom of entertainment could be put
thus: entertainment was equally protected with other speech, but
that protection would be unequally withdrawn since its social
value was not of the same weight as that belonging to other areas
of expression. Whatever one may think of a theory of social
utility in the matter of speech, the facts in the film cases seem
to point up its current adoption by the majority of the Court.145
Other differentiating elements are less theoretical. The fact
that obscenity has become almost the only standard proper for
film censorship,' 46 indicates the narrow scope which the licensing
140 This does not mean that movies are not also ranked as one of the arts,
but simply that the industry is set up as a medium of mass entertainment.
Manvell, Film and the Public 227-28 (1955).
'41 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. con-
curring). Alexander Meiklejohn has made the political process of self-government
the basis of his theory of free speech. See Meiklejohn, Free Speech (1948) and,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, Sup. Ct. Rev. 245-65 (1961). But in this
last article he makes it plain that art (including movies) is part of the protected
political process, id. at 262-63.
142 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
'48 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Justice Reed for the majority
seems to give entertainment protected status by default when he said, "The line
between informing and entertainin is too elusive for the protection of that
[exposition of ideas] basic right." Id. at 510.
L44 The fact that censorship of a free medium has been approved in any
form is such an indication. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
(1961). See, Adams Theatre, Co. v. Kennan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519 (1953).
145 See, Kalven supra note 111 at 11.
146 Although the court has never explicitly limited censorship to this single
standard, most people have read their opinions as indicating that. See, Nimmer,
The Constitutionality of Official Censorship of Motion Pictures, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev.
625 (1958). Also, this estimation is reflected in the legislation that Pennsylvania
passed in 1959. Supra note 67.
MOrON Picrucm CE, sowsnIP
power of the censor now has. This was not always the case.4 7
There was a time when the censor was given a mandate to rove
at large behind such indefinite standards as "the best interests
of the people."1 48 Then, too, a distinctive feature of film control
is the fact that the speech in question is before the licensing
official so that judgment on it is not of a conjectural nature.149
Where an official issues a license to speak based on evidence en-
tirely extrinsic to the speech itself,150 there is grave danger that
his judgment will prevent a legitimate communication of ideas.
But where, as in film licensing, the speech itself is before the
official as it will be presented to the public, at least the denial
of license can be compared to the speech questioned.' 5 ' Further,
the distinction made in Kingsley Books 52 between restraint fall-
ing on communication before publication and after might be
behind the Court's sustaining motion picture licensing, especially
where it is done on a community, and not a state, basis. The
film is already published and may have been shown elsewhere
in the state before it is reviewed by the local board of censors.
It would seem captious to demand that each film should have
one free showing and then allow the state to step in with the
censor. This would hardly be a constitutional distinction on which
protection could be based.153
One of the worse features of the film licensing system is the
costly delays that may take place between the time a refusal
of a license is first made and a final determination of the issue
by a court.'54 The right to appeal from the censor's decision seems
147 The broad scope of the censor's powers is indicated by the standards
discussed in supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. For a description of the
abuses, see Kupferman & O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis Blues,
36 Cornell L.Q. 273 (1951).
148 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
149 For this point, see Shapiro, Prior Restraint and Free Speech (unpublished
thesis in Harvard Law School Library 1957). This was the defect that was
condemned in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
150 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
151 The fact that the film is part of the record allows the court to view the
speech in question exactly as it was before the licensing official. American Civil
Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 ll.2d 334 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954). This
point is made by Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev.
533 (1951).
152 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).153 Ibid.
154 This delay is directly related to the property right in the film which the
owner or distributor has. Typical of the amount of time involved in litigating the
issue of withholding a license for a film is that found in "Lady Chatterley s Lover":
(Footnote continued on next page)
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to be protected whether granted by the licensing statute or not,'55
but whether the movie litigant can appeal to the courts before he
has exhausted his remedies within the licensing system itself is
doubtful. 5 The judgment of the censor represents an administra-
tive decision which courts tend to uphold on grounds of legisla-
tive authorization, but the deference shown by the courts in
review can be adjusted to the type of determination and the
amount of expertise involved. 5 7 In the movie cases courts
have moved away from the criterion of abuse of discretion to
a fuller de novo determination of the issue. 58 This is possible
because of the presence of the film as part of the record. But
there remains the difficulty that during the long litigation the
exhibitor is prevented from showing a film which may, in the
end, receive approval. The loss to both himself and the com-
munity can hardly be repaired by a later showing.
The use of prior licensing of motion pictures is a unique ex-
periment in peace-time censorship which has against it traditional
distrust, Supreme Court dicta, not to say a bad personal record.
Still the Court has refused to strike it down as a system of con-
trol. The answer to the conundrum of why the Court has con-
tinued to endorse the use of prior restraint in an area of free
expression lies in the unique features of the movies as a medium
and the subsidiary problem of obscenity. Further, the invalida-
tion of a whole system of control seems to go beyond the pur-
poses of the Court and encroach upon the policy choices of the
state. Justice Black has complained that the Court should not
place itself in the midst of such policy questions as obscenity and
motion pictures,1 9 but by invalidating an entire method of con-
trol in the abstract the Court would have effectively set policy
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
license denied May 1956-Supreme Court reversed censor's decision as uncon-
stitutional June 1959. There is no provision for a speedy trial of the issue in
movie cases as New York provides for books thought to be obscene. See, Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, ibid.
155 Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N.W. 152 (1936); Thayer
Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 7 A.2d 682 (1939).
156It would seem that the argument made for a direct challenge of the
licensing official's denial would not be valid since the system itself has been
approved in Times Film.
157 Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474(1951).
158 American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 834, 121
N.E.2d 585 (1954).
159 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 860 U.S. 684, 691
(1959).
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for the state. It is from a respect for the federal system and the
separation of powers that the Court has continued to pursue a
method of balancing which answers to the demands of each case,
without at the same time refusing to give certain general prin-
ciples as a guide to the future.
III.
Times Film may be considered a bold experiment by the
Court or an exercise in tradition, depending on your point of view.
But the dangers involved were not inconsiderable. The feeling
expressed by the Chief Justice that there was no way to check
the spread of censorship to other areas of communication was
shared by others. Indeed, the citation of Times Film by a dis-
senting New York judge' 60 would indicate that it could be read
as precedent for refusing to license a political speaker. Such
careless use of precedent gave reason for siding with Warren
in his charge that the Court had opened the way to censorship.
However, those who foresaw the dangers in Times Film and
its apparent lack of concise principles were underestimating the
abilities of other courts to see and understand the decision in
its four corners. Thus in at least three cases the approval of
censorship as given here was not an occasion for enlargement,
but restriction, of the censor's power.
In Zenith Int'l Films Corp. v. City of Chicago 161 the same
licensing system which the Supreme Court had refused to strike
down in toto in Times Film was criticized for its failure to pro-
vide adequate procedural safeguards. The case involved a re-
fusal of license to the French film "The Lovers." In an attempt
to work out a compromise on the amount to be cut from the film,
the distributor met with indifference and an intra-office dispute.
The result was that the initial conditions were maintained after
the mayor had reviewed the decision by viewing only a single
reel of the film. The Seventh Circuit found that no substantial
procedural justice had been done and reversed the decision of
the lower court upholding the censor's finding.162 The court re-
ferred to Times Film in concluding:
160 Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 41 (1961) (Eager, J., dissenting).
161291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961).
162 It is not clear from the case whether the reversal was an order to issue a
license or whether it remanded the film for a fair procedure before the Chicago
board.
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The recent Times Film decision does not provide a
carte blanche authorization for ad hoc, unfair, abortive
municipal licensing procedures. We reemphasize that it
does hold that a city has the power to impose a system
of prior restraints on movies, if it does so properly.16e
This "proper" use of censorship will have to include more of
the traditional safeguards of trial procedure if it is to receive
approval from the courts.
Another case dealing with the same movie came to the same
conclusion.04 Here, however, the movie exhibitor had shown his
film after a license had been denied and was charged with a
criminal violation of the Portland, Oregon, licensing ordinance.
By demurrer the defendant waived a jury trial and won his case
on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. That body felt that
the complaint against the defendant did not state a crime on
which conviction could be made since it charged only that he
had failed to make two cuts in a film.165 No reasons for the cuts
were given and no opportunity to show that the film met city
standards had been allowed. This was not the type of crime
which cities were allowed to prosecute. The Oregon court as-
sumed "without directly deciding that the city may censor mo-
tion pictures without running afoul the First Amendment, as
suggested by the Supreme Court in Times Film v. City of
Chicago."16 This interpretation of Times Film appears exces-
sively guarded, but it indicates that Oregon is not surrendering
its right to rule on film censorship in the future.
Pennsylvania went even further in its declaration of inde-
pendence from the interpretation of the Supreme Court. In
deciding William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana'6 the Supreme
Court of that state held that all prior censorship was outlawed
by the Constitution of Pennsylvania once and for all. 6" In 1959
the legislature had passed a new Motion Picture Control Act
163 Zenith Int'l Films Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir.
1961).
164 City of Portland v. Welch, 364 P.2d 1009 (Ore. 1961).
165 It is not clear whether the fault lay in the wording of the indictment or
whether the court would have cut through to the real issue of lack of procedural
due process anyway.
166 Id. at 1012.
167 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
168 Pa. Const. art. 1, §7 (1874). The wording that the court appeared to
rely on was that which held a person as "being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty."
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which was carefully tailored to the specifications of the Supreme
Court's decisions on movies and obscenity.169 This Act was chal-
lenged by injunction on grounds that it violated the constitutional
right to freedom from prior restraint. The federal grounds were
abandoned after the Times Film case came down,170 and in-
validity was argued solely from the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In upholding this contention the majority of four justices read
the text of their fundamental law as prohibiting any prior con-
trols.171 But they then went on to point out individual difficulties
with the Act, major among which was the lack of a trial
determination of the issue of obscenity.172 In dissent three jus-
tices found great difficulty with the reading of the Pennsylvania
Constitution in a manner contrary to the federal oneY.3 Then,
too, the interpretations of various sections of the Act were made
in such a way as to make them invalid, going contrary to the
ordinary procedure of the court to read any law so as to save it. 7 4
Finally, the dissent pointed up the problem of the court's strik-
ing down an act which had received all but unanimous support
in the legislature, had been the fruit of careful investigation and
had not been given an opportunity to function at all.'76 But the
1694 Pa. Stat. §70.1-70.14. The Act adopted the obscenity definition from
Roth, §70.1(6); and the suggestion from Kingsley Books that some publication
should be allowed before review, §70.3.
170 Argument of the case was postponed until the Supreme Court had
decided the Times Film case. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa.
83, 95, 173 A.2d 59, 71 (1961).
17 1 Pa. Const. art. 1, §7 (1874).
172 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 98, 173 A.2d
59, 64. Pa. Const. art. 1, §§6, 9 (1874). Since a person could be convicted on
the grounds of communicating obscene materials on the basis of a denial of
license by the board of censors, the majority felt that the right to a jury trial on
the issue of obscenity would be denied.
173 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 85-86, 173 A.2d
59, 71-72.
174 Id. at 102, 173 A.2d at 78. This raises the problem which the Supreme
Court appeared to have avoided in the Times Film case, viz., the construction
of a statute challenged as void-on-its-face. See Note, 1961 Wisc. L. Rev. 659.
17 Id at 103, 173 A.2d at 79. This point is made by Kauper, Civil Lib-
erties and the Constitution 73-74 (1962):
It must be remembered that obscenity legislation may effect all readers
and that it does not operate with discriminatory effect upon one particular
group of persons as in the case of legislation directed against expression of
political or religious views by unpopular minority groups. Here is a case
vhere the ordinary legislative processes are adequate to deal with the
problem and where a preponderant public sentiment should indeed play a
controlling part. If people do not care to have obscenity legislation, their
efforts should be directed to repeal of this legislation. Obscenity laws may
be ill-conceived and inadequate to achieve the purpose of promoting public
morals. But it is not the business of the courts to condemn as uncon-
stitutional legislation they regard as unwise or ineffective.
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result was clear. The state was not going to wait on the Supreme
Court for a protection of fights that belonged to citizens of that
state.
If further guarantees are needed that the narrow approval
of Times Film will not result in a run-away censor, we must look
to the Court itself. It has shown a continuing interest in pro-
tecting the right of films to be communicated to the public at
large as long as they do not infringe the counter right of the
state to protect the community against the corrupting effects of
obscene or pornographic movies. That this interest will continue
has been implied in the very nature of the method adopted by
the Court in Times Film.
